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REMARKS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)
at the Sympos i um
UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS, FAYETTEVILLE, ARKANSAS
March 9, 1968- 8:00p.m., c.s.t.

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES:

REAPPRAISAL

AND REAPPORTIONMENT

It is with deep respect that I refer to the contribution to the nation which is derived from the Senators of th; s
State.

May I say that the honorary law doctorate from Arkansas

University which is held by John McClellan is most appropriate
in view of hi s outstanding work in the Senate.

Under h i s di rect iol

the Committee on Government Operations has achieved national
r enown by br i nging a correct i ve legal l i ght into certain mo re or
less obscure corners of American life and practice.
As fo r J. Will i am Fulbr;ght, the c ontr i bution of
the former President of this University is one which I have experienced directly i n the Committee on For e ; an
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Fulbright possesses one of the finest intellects in the Senate.
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He keeps it honed, moreover, to a razor's edge by a fierce integrity.

His importance to this nation and its foreign relations

predates the problem of Viet Nam and, long after that problem is
res olved, his influence for internatjonal order will continue to
be felt.
If I were to speak on the public issue which is
most on my mind (and I expect that it is also most on yours) I
would focus on Viet Nam.

Yet, this problem has dominated our

attention for so long that there is danger in the excess. Understandably but regrettably, the anxieties to which Viet Nam gives
rise

tend to i nvite neglect of other grave intern ational

questions.
Viet Nam is a part of our worldwide commitments;
it is not the whole.

The over- all pattern of these commitments

was in need of deep reappraisal even before the tragedy of Viet
Nam assumed its present dimensions.

The war has not obviated the

need ; if anyth ing, it has made it more compelling.

If our own

perceptions do not soon bring us to this reappraisal, we may well
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be led to it, helter-skelter, by circumstances which lie beyond
our control.
For many years, there has been a cont i nuous flow
abroad of human and material resources in support of the defense
and other policies of this nation.

Today, the flow is a flood to

Viet Nam, even as it remains heavy elsewhere in Asia and in Europe
and other parts of the world.

There is ample indication that the

worldwide load which we are carrying may be greater than necessary.
Certainly it is already greater than can be sustained at the current
level of national sacrifice.
The effect of the outward drain is felt in many ways.
At home, it bears a relationship to our apparent inability to come
to grips with the situation in the urban areas.

As a case in

point, it should be noted that a special Presidential Commission
has just completed a monumental report on this problem.

The

Commission emphasizes that the crisis in the cities cries out for
a great concentration of constructive effort.

Yet, I am frank to

say that in the light of our national engagements abroad, the

- 4 prospects for finding the national will and the resources for this
concentration are not encouraging.
The costly overseas commitment also bears relationship to the huge budgetary deficits and to the pressures of inflation which are generated therein.

Its effect is felt, too, in the

nation's balance of international payments; for some years _ now,
this gauge has flashed the warnings of financial over-extension.
It is now clear that we have been trying to do too
muuh with too li ttle in the way of national sacrifice.
are going to be necessary.

Adjustments

In fact, they have already begun.

That

is the significance of a recent Presidential order .
which called for a ten percent cut in governmental personnel
overseas.

That is the significance of the sharply reduced alloca-

tion for foreign aid in this year's budget.

These are, in my

judgment, wise actionsj however limited,they do compel more care
i n evaluating current foreign undertakings.

- 5 The Administration has also called for complementary
actions which will require increased sacrifices from the people
of the nation.

That is the meaning of the recent call-up of more

reservists, the ending of certain draft deferments, and other manpower changes.

That, too, is the meaning of proposals to discour-

age travel and investment overseas by Americans and the request
for a surtax on top of the i_ncome tax.

Whatever their individual

merit, all of these measures are clear calls for a greater contribution to the nat i on.
sounding.

They are, moreover, only the first note's

There will be more to come, far more, if there is no

curtailment in the present pattern of our

overseas engage-

ment.
That we face an urgent situation is largely the
consequence of the heavy demands of the conflict in Viet Nam.

The

war, however, has only underscored what has long been, in fact,
the need for a thorough reassessment of our worldwide responsibili ties.

These responsibil i t -L es stj_l l derive from international

circumstances as they were many years ago.

Yet, we have not had
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occasion to think long and deeply about their present validity.
We have not had occasion to ask whether a kind of obsolescence
or inertia of policy is not exacting an excessive tribute .
May I say that

wh ~ le

a thorough reassessment of our

overseas commitments might be carri ed out by a new Administration,
I reject categorically the notion that i t can be carried out only
by a new Administration.

The latter content ion is already heard

and you may expect to hear it with ever- i ncreasing frequency in
the months ahead.

In reality, however, we are confronted with a

problem which i s deeper than elect ion-year poli t i cs.

It go es to

the capacity of both the Executive Branch and t he Congress t o face
up to the facts of the situat ion i n whi ch we find ourselves.

It

goes to the capacity of elected offic i als and appo inted off ic i als,
most o f whom serve i n admini strat ion after admi nistra tion, t o look
anew and to thi nk anew.

It goes t o the national read l ness to

bring our responses into l i ne wi t h today's i nterna tiona l
rea l i ties .

- 7 In any assessment of our situation abroad, it can
be said that our present commitment began with the United Nations
Charter, almost a quarter of a century ago.

People of my genera-

tion thought to end once and for all, as the U. N. Charter terms
it,

11

the scourge of war."

We sought to replace a hi t-or-miss

national control of war with a form of international consortium
to maintain the peace.

We acted to initiate a universal system

of mutual security, order and progress tn the United Nat ions.
From the outset, the concepts of the United Nations
Charter did not work or, at any rate, worked very inadequately.
It was not long before the

pr ~ncipal

nations of the world fell back

once again upon the not unfamil jar rivalries of national power and
alliances.

Unl i ke what had transp i red after World War I, the

United States plunged into the vanguard of these practices.

We

took the lead i n expandi ng a system of defense alliances which
reached into almost every part of the globe.

We put our primary

trust for national security in this system and in our own unilatera J
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military capacities--especially in nuclear weapons over which we
exercised a brief monopoly.
The Soviet Union was the focus of our concerns.
We saw Moscow at the p innacle of a Communist monolj_th, with one
side extending down into Eastern Europe and the other resting on
what was presumed to be a Soviet=enslaved China.
Communist part ie s and leaders

ev~here

dancing to tunes played by Stalin.
able bear.

We viewed all

in the world as puppets

We saw Communism as an insati-

We saw it as the tentacles of a giant octopus.

We

saw it i n many other forms and shapes--hideous, inhuman and
irreconcilably hostile.
Over-simplified o r not, this concept was of great
Slgnificance after World War II

in precipitating the massive

expansion of our overseas commitments.

It induced

once wary of any involvement beyond the Western

th ~ s

nation,

Hemispher~

accept unprecedented internat ·L onal responsibilities.

to

The fear

of Soviet expans ion was not the only factor in thjs process.
Rather, that fear was interwoven with an intellectual revulsion
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against any return to prewar isolation, with a deep-seated American idealism for peace and with a broad sympathy for the countless
millions of the less fortunate on earth.
Sometimes with reluctance, sometimes with enthusiasm, but invar i ably wi th a new sense of leadership, this nation
launched . programs of many kinds throughout the world.

The

magnitude of th i.s effort is suggested by the over-all totals of
ai.d since 1946.

To date, the United States has provided in the

neighborhood of $130 b i llion in grants and loans to about 120
nations.
In the pursuit of a fool-proof security, moreover,
we entered into defense treat i es with s o robust an enthusiasm
that the term "pactomania" found jts way into the language.

By

1954, there were formal defense ties with 42 nations, most of whom
were embraced by three great regional all i ances.

The Inter-Ameri-

can Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance included all of the Latin
American nations.

The North Atlantic Treaty stretched across

the ocean and to the Eastern Med i terranean to take in Greece and
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Turkey.

The SEATO Treaty brought us into defensive concert with

ten nations on behalf of the security of the Asian and Pacific
region.
After 1954, additional countries received assurances in the nature of defense commj tments from the United States.
By this process, Spain, Iran and Liberia were brought under a
kind of protective wing of this nat ion and s o , too, were both the
Arab states and Israel.

Finally, in 1962, this nation felt

compelled to advise India and Pakistan--both recipients of U. S.
military aid against Communism--that if one, instead, used this
assistance against the other, the United States would undertake
to act on behalf of the vict im .
In short, as of today, by request o r otherwise, by
formal treaty or otherwise, more than 50 nations have received a
chit--a commitment--from the United St ates which is redeemable
for some kind of military assistance in a crisis.
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Over the years, we have undergirded these pledges
with elaborate bilateral and multilateral military o rganizations.
There has come into existence

unified military commands such as

NATO in Europe and SEATO in Southeast Asia.

Cement for these

structures has been supplied by massive inputs of U. S. aid.
Over the years our defense undertakings have grown
until, today, we station overseas a million and a half of the
three and a half million Americans in uniform.
of course, is

Heading the list,

the contigent of more than 500,000 in Viet Nam.

There are 200,000 located elsewhere in the Far East and 350,000
are i n installations in Europe and the Mediterranean .
Some concept of the cost is to be found in the
military expenditures in Viet Nam and in the over - all expenditures
of the Department of Defense.

The cost of the war is conserva-

tively estimated at upwards of $25 billion a year.

That figure

is 31 percent of the budget of the Department of Defense which
is $80 billion.

The total for the Department of Defense, in

turn, is 42.9 percent of all federal expenditures.
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As I have already indicated, it was an initial
concern with Soviet expansion which did so much to precipitate
our vast overseas commitment.

This concern began to be felt

almost immediately after the guns of World War II were stilled.
It was felt in quarrels and disagreements among the victors over
the peace treaties.

It was felt, too, in propagandistic strutting,

often over minor questions which came before the United Nations
in its early years.

It was felt in the irreconcilable positions

which were taken on the fundamental issue of international control
of nuclear energy.

The concern was intensified as the Soviet

blockade of Berlin was followed by tr.e cataclysmic collapse in
China and, finally, by the Korean conflict.
The military alliances and the aid which we

pro-

vided did act to buJld up a rmed st rength in Europe as a counterpoise to Soviet

Co~nunism.

Economic assistance did help the

nations of Europe to rebuild their economies and, hence, the
security of their free societies ; and it did open, at least, the
poss ib ilit~s

of modern progress in many neglected and newly

i ndependent nations of the world.

- 13 In the years after World War II, we had ample
resources for these undertakings .
unscathed from the conflict .
dynami c growth .

Our economy had emerged

It had entered on a period of

The accumulation of neglected inner problems

was not yet of toweri ng dimensions.

In brief, wi th li t tle strain

at home, we were able to engage ourselves widely in these undertakings abroad.
Today, our internal circumstances are no t a s they
were a decade and a half ago .
and a half ago .

Nor i s the wo rld as it was a decade

These two fact ors, whi ch are fundamental i n the

design of effective f o reign po licy, have changed very greatly.
Can i t be sai d, h owever, that the poli cy i tself-- t he fus i ng of
understanding , i dea a nd c ommitment wh j_ch should f or m polic y--has
been adjusted adequa te l y i n the light o f these chang es ?

It seems

to me most doubtful that i t can be s o said. On the contrary, a
fore ign po licy grown r out i ne over many years ma y we l l be t aking
too much out of th i s nat i on .

It may wel l have become wa st e ful,

- 14 to say the least .

Even more serious, it may have become of increas·

ing irrelevance to the situation which now exists in the world.
As a case i n po i nt, it seems to me that the situat ion in Europe bears close examination.

In Europe--in the two

Europea, East and West--the mutual fears of an earlier time have
receded.

The level of cordiality among governments is rising as

it is among the peoples of

Eur~pe .

The barriers are coming down .

Trade, travel, and other exchange, from the Atlantic to the Urals,
is beginning to flourish .
In Western Europe, the once war-devastated democracies have raised their economies to levels of unprecedented
productivity and prosperity.

From a desperate financial depen-

dency on AITerican assistance two decades ago , some of our allies
have become holders and even manipulators of great dollar surpluses .

These surpluses are formed in part from usual commercial

sources such as American tourist expenditures and investments in
Europe.

They are also created in large part, however, fr0m heavy
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U. S. government spending abroaC. in pursuit of various commitments,
especially the military commitment to NATO.

This commitment

involves the maintenance of slx U. S. divisions in Europe which,
together with dependents , numbers 600,000 Americans.
It should be noted that these Americans are in
Europe in accord with a Senate recommendation 1'7hich was made

17 years ago.

In 1951, the Senate urged that the U. S. troop

commitment in Europe be raised from the two

under-

strength divisions remaining after '!J"orld War II to a pledge of
six divisions for NATO.

This recommendatj_on was put promptly

into effect.
By way of contrast, last year, a resolution was
sponsored by

44 Senators which recommended a return of a substan-

tial part of these six divisions to the United States.

I have

felt for many years that our commitment to NATO could be cut back
to two divisions at a great

sav ~ ngs

of resources and without in

any way lessening the signi ficance of our pledge of mutual
defense under the North Atlantic Treaty.
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Unl ike 17 years ago, however, there has been no
prompt response to these suggestions from the Senate.

There has

been, on the contrary, a determined resistance to any adjustments
downward in the U. S. force-levels in Europe.

Ignored is the

fact that we alone of all the participants have met our pledges
to NATO.
reduction.

Unheeded have been the pleas from the Senate for a
Unnoticed, or at any rate ignored,have been the obvi-

ous changes in the European situation--the relaxation between
Eastern and Western Europe.

Overlooked has been the growing

European indifference to NATO.
Last year, it was announced that there would be
a token redeployment to the Uni ted States of 35,000 men and their
dependents out of the 350,000 American forces stationed in Europe.
The redeployment was scheduled to begi n on January 1, 1968.

On

January 25, 1968, however, it was announced that the redeployment
has been postponed for ''admin i strative reasons.

11

In short, s i x American divisions,with dependents,
remain assigned to Europe, today, as they were a decade and a
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half ago.

The response to the financial drain which they repre-

sent so far has been largely confined to the discouragement of
private American travel and investment abroad.
Elsewhere, there are also changes to which our
policies have been slow to adjust, if,in fact,they have adjusted
at all.

The concept of a Communist monolith which did so much to

shape our basic policies has long since toppled.

Many years ago

Yugoslavia chose a path of national Communism, independent of
Soviet · domination.

Over the years, the Yugoslavianexperience

has proved to be not an isolated phenomenon but an accurate foreshadowing of reassertions of national independence throughout
E·:ustE>rn

Europe.

Far from being cogs in a Russian war machine,

the nat j_ons of that region are emphasizing their own national
needs.
ing

w ~th

To satisfy them--they are heavily economic--they are turnfrequency and ever- i ncreasing self-assurance to tjes with

the Hesteru European uati cns and other non-Communist countries.
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Asia~

a China which once was seen as an obse-

quious handmaiden of Moscow has chosen so fiercely an independent
posit jon that it has skirted open hostility with the Soviet Uninn.
At least, such was the case prior to the intensification of the
war in Viet Narn.

For sometime, China, too, has been explori ng

contacts with the rest of the world.

Despite the setback of the

recent ideological upheavals and the counter-pressures of Viet Nam,
this pro cess is likely to be resumed now that a measure of internal
order has returned.
There have been other significant development s
which relate to the continuing validity of our costly overseas
commitments.

About 50 nations, for example, have become inaepen-

dent and members of the U. N. since

1954;

yet that organization

has been allowed to lose significance as a factor i n the res olut ion of the world's d ifficulties .

France and China have joined

the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom as
possessors of nuclear weapons ; and i t

is saj_d that just one
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explosive in the bulging nuclear arsenals has as much explosive
power as has been used in all wars since the invention of gunpowder.

Yet, the approach to serious disputes, whether in the

Middle East or Southeast Asia or wherever, suggests little awareness of the tic king of the doomsday clock.
In sum, it is apparent that the environment in
which the United States must seek its security, today, is vastly
different from what it was a few years ago.

It is also apparent,

today, that there are flaws in the instruments of policy by which
we have pursued our security over the years.

The concept of mutual

defense, for example, has been and remains, in practice, overwhelmingly weighted on the side of the American contribution of
resources even though other nations are quite capable of j_ncreasing their contributions.
Foreign aid, too, has been seen not always to
yield the intended result.

I have mentioned how assistance to

both India and Pakistan to counter Communist pressures compelled
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us, in the end, to give an additional commitment of support to
each of these nations as against the possible aggression of the
other.

Similar ironic developments are discernible in Latin

America and elsewhere.

In short, while we may point the blade of

military ai d in one direction, once the swo rd is in othe r hands,
it is not always possible to say where or when it will fall.
It is now apparent, too, that economic aid does not
act in non-industrialized nati ons as it did i n helping the indus trialized nations of Europe and Japan to reconstruct war-damaged
economies.

Thus, the great effectiveness of the Marshall Plan

has had only the faintest of echoes elsewhere in the world.

Aid

in Asia and Africa does not necessarily spur progress or strengthen
freedom .

Indeed, on occasion it ma y offer a means for evading

the one and for stunting the growth of the other.
Finally, it is now apparent that our resources for
the uses of international security are not unlimited .

Despite

great wealth, we cannot continue to spend on overseas commitments
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at the present rate and still meet the growing internal needs of
this nation.

Certainly, we cannot do so without large increases

in taxes, much more regimentation, and other sacrifices on the
part of all Americans.

To put j_t bluntly, we have learned that

we cannot allocate $25 billion a year or more on war in Viet Nam,
billions more for defense elsewhere in Asia, in Europe, and other
parts of the globe, and still invest at home in education, health,
housing, transportation, control of air and water pollution,
police protection, or whatever, at a rate which is vital to the
inner stability of this nation.
Most important, we are learning in Viet Nam, at a
tragic cost that an immensity of military power is not enough to
safeguard peace or to yield a relevant freedom.

It is not enough

in a situation where the issues in conflict are not black and
white but many shades of grays.

We are learning, too, in Viet

Nam that what may begin as a modest effort to assist others can
become a nightmare of destruction and a major military involvement

- 22 for this nation.

Uncurbed, it can grow as an open-ended war

until there is no exit for any nation--except in the final idiocy
of the nuclear devastation of the earth.
These are the c o nsiderations which strongly urge,
it seems to me, a continuing and intensive appraisal o f our
commitments abroad.

It is an appraisal which should take place

throughout the nation no less than in the Executive Branch of the
government and in the Senate.

There is a great need for national

soul-searching at this critical moment in the history of the
Republic.
It seems to me already evident that the time is
past due for reduc ing the one-sjded emphasis o n the American contribution in safeguarding the security of freedom and peace in
the world.

I would urge, in thjs connection, as I have urged

many times before,and as the Senate urged only a few months ago
by unan imous resolution,that the potentialities of the United
Nations be openly engaged with a v i ew to searching out the path

- 23 to an honorable ending of the war in Viet Nam.

In this connec-

tion, too, I would urge once again-as I have urged many times
before and as many Members of the Senate have urged--that a
substantial reduction of U. S. forces in Western Europe begin
without further delay.
In my judgment, these adjustments are urgent.
They need not wait for reappraisals.
time and again.

They have been appraised

They are needed, now, in an effort to bring

our commitments into better rapport with the current international
situation and with the inner needs of this nation.

They are

needed,now, to check the drift of this nation towards an isolated
and, hence, irrelevant internationalism.

